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ABSTRACT
Internet users increasingly rely on commercial virtual private net-
work (VPN) services to protect their security and privacy. The VPN
services route the client’s traffic over an encrypted tunnel to a VPN
gateway in the cloud. Thus, they hide the client’s real IP address
from online services, and they also shield the user’s connections
from perceived threats in the access networks. In this paper, we
study the security of such commercial VPN services. The focus is
on how the client applications set up VPN tunnels, and how the
service providers instruct users to configure generic client soft-
ware. We analyze common VPN protocols and implementations
on Windows, macOS and Ubuntu. We find that the VPN clients
have various configuration flaws, which an attacker can exploit to
strip off traffic encryption or to bypass authentication of the VPN
gateway. In some cases, the attacker can also steal the VPN user’s
username and password. We suggest ways to mitigate each of the
discovered vulnerabilities.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Software security engineering.
KEYWORDS
Commercial VPN, VPN client configuration
1 INTRODUCTION
Virtual private networks (VPN) [67] were originally developed for
connecting geographically distributed corporate networks to each
other with encrypted tunnels, so that they would form a single
secure logical network. Their functionality was also extended for
connecting remote workers to the employer’s intranet. However,
one of the most common uses of VPN today is to protect regular
Internet users who seek improved security and privacy. Such users
perceive a need for a VPN in many different situations, such as
when accessing the Internet over public Wi-Fi (e.g. at a cafe, hotel,
or airport), to hide their online activities from an oppressive entity
(e.g. government, employer or Internet service provider), or to
access geoblocked media content. Because of the increased demand,
a large number of commercial VPN services have appeared in the
market [41].
Commercial VPNs typically function by tunneling the user’s In-
ternet traffic through a trusted remote server before it is forwarded
to its final destination. This achieves two goals: first, the traffic is
protected by an encrypted VPN tunnel against dangers in the access
network and, second, the destination server does not learn the real
IP address of the client. There are quite a few VPN protocols that
can be used to establish the tunnel (e.g. PPTP, SSTP, OpenVPN), and
the commercial VPN providers usually support several of them. The
commercial VPN providers also provide native client applications
with graphical user interfaces, which allow the user to select the
protocol and server and set up the VPN connection accordingly. For
more technically savvy users who prefer not to install the provided
application, the VPN service providers usually give instructions for
configuring the built-in VPN client in the user’s operating system
(OS) to work with their servers.
The commercial VPN services have undergone severe scrutiny [3,
20, 21, 26, 27, 57, 60], which has exposed various malpractices and
vulnerabilities in the services. A handful of researchers have taken
a closer look at the client configuration in the commercial VPNs [26,
27, 57]. These studies revealed a number of misconfigurations of
popular VPN services that lead to user de-anonymization and traffic
leakage. Our work extends this theme in the literature with the
focus on the security of the VPN tunnels, namely whether they are
encrypted and authenticated properly.
Motivation. Our work was primarily motivated by the observa-
tion that many commercial VPN providers configure L2TP/IPsec, a
popular VPN protocol, in an insecure way. Specifically, the proto-
col relies on IPsec [29] to provide the secure transport, but many
VPN providers use one pre-shared key for all users to authenticate
the IPsec tunnels. These service-specific keys are either publicly
available online or can be discovered by examining the client config-
uration. An example of such a pre-shared key is “12345678”. When
an attacker knows the pre-shared key, it can perform a man-in-
the-middle (MitM) attack on the VPN connection and, as the result,
obtain all the network traffic to and from the victim’s computer.
This problem was already discussed on public forums in 2016 [18].
When we re-analyzed the 14 insecure commercial VPN services
mentioned in the discussion, we found that only four of them had
fixed the problem or stopped supporting the L2TP/IPsec protocol,
while 10 were still using the insecure configuration. Whatever the
reason is, this security issue remains opaque to most end-users.
Thus, we feel that it is important to scrutinize systematically the
client configurations of commercial VPN services, considering both
L2TP/IPsec and other protocols, for flaws that could undermine the
user’s security and privacy.
Contributions. In this paper, we study how popular commercial
VPN providers set up, or how they instruct users to set up, desktop
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PPTP SSTP L2TP/IPSec Cisco IPSec IKEv2 OpenVPN SoftEther VPN
Windows Built-in Built-in Built-in Shrew Soft Built-in OpenVPN SoftEther
macOS – EasySSTP Built-in Built-in Built-in OpenVPN SoftEther
Ubuntu Built-in sstp-client xl2tpd Shrew Soft StrongSwan OpenVPN SoftEther
Table 1: VPN clients that are used or recommended by commercial VPN providers.
VPN clients for common VPN protocols. Our study covers three
common desktop operating systems: Windows, macOS and Ubuntu.
The study reveals various vulnerabilities in the configurations of
VPN clients, which allow attackers to strip off traffic encryption
or to bypass server authentication. By exploiting these vulnerabili-
ties, attackers can intercept network traffic to and from the victim.
Some of the vulnerabilities also allow the attacker to steal user
credentials for to authenticating the VPN gateway. To the best of
our knowledge, the vulnerabilities that we present in this paper
have not been discussed before in research literature. While each
of the vulnerabilities alone might seem like a trivial mistake, to-
gether they indicate a serious lack of security-awareness across the
commercial VPN industry, and we feel that it is the responsibility
of the research community to raise the issue.
We have disclosed all of the vulnerabilities to the responsible
parties, and we include the responses that we received so far in
the paper. We also provide guidelines on fixing the vulnerabilities.
Through this work, we hope to raise awareness among the com-
mercial VPN providers about common configuration mistakes and
how they can be avoided.
Paper organization. Section 2 provides background information
on commercial VPN services. Section 3 gives an overview of our
study, and Section 4 covers the vulnerabilities that were found
in the client configurations of popular commercial VPN services.
Mitigation solutions are covered in Section 5. Section 7 discusses the
results. Finally, Section 8 summarizes related work, and Section 9
concludes the paper.
2 BACKGROUND
This section gives an overview of commercial VPN services and
their client software.
2.1 Overview of commercial VPN services
The focus of this paper is on commercial VPNs, whose usage differs
from that of corporate VPNs. The corporate VPNs (also known as
enterprise or business VPNs) are set up by organizations to allow
their employees to remotely access resources, such as web and
file servers, on the corporate intranet. In such networks, system
administrators usually pre-configure employee devices with the
required client software.
The commercial VPNs (also known as personal or consumer
VPNs), on the other hand, are subscription-based services available
to regular Internet users. They allow users to tunnel their Inter-
net traffic via the service provider’s gateway server somewhere in
the cloud. The commercial VPNs are typically used for personal
purposes, such as accessing geoblocked or country-specific media
contents and for securing sensitive online activities while on pub-
lic Wi-Fi networks. They are also used to avoid censorship and
surveillance by local governments and access-network operators.
However, the users of commercial VPNs route their network traffic
through the VPN provider’s gateway, which means that they have
to trust the VPN provider as well as the country where the gateway
server is located. To overcome this trust issue, the commercial VPN
providers often promise to keep no logs of the customer activities
and allow users to choose VPN servers in countries with strong
personal privacy laws (e.g. Switzerland and Iceland).
2.2 Commercial VPN client software
Most commercial VPN providers have a native client application,
which sets up the VPN connection for the user. These client applica-
tions are usually available for the Windows and macOS operating
systems. To use a native client application, users must first enter
their VPN user-login credentials into the client application. The
application pulls configuration data, such as VPN server addresses,
roots of trust for the authentication, and VPN-client credentials
(which are not necessarily the same as the user-login credentials),
from the VPN provider’s server. The client application then config-
ures the VPN tunnel for later use. The client application typically
allows the user to choose from many different VPN protocols for
the tunnel implementation, either to circumvent firewalls or to
match user preferences.
The native client applications rely on the operating system’s built-
in VPN client functionality whenever it exists. They usually use
the routing and remote access service (RRAS) [9] on Windows and
NEVPNManager APIs [4] on macOS to programmatically create
and manage VPN connections. Windows is bundled with imple-
mentations of the PPTP, L2TP/IPsec, SSTP and IKEv2 protocols,
while macOS comes with L2TP/IPsec, IKEv2 and Cisco IPsec client
functionality. For the protocols that have no built-in support in
the OS, the commercial VPN providers include third-party client
binaries in their native applications. Table 1 shows the preferred or
recommended VPN clients for each of the studied VPN protocols
on the three OSs we consider in this study.
The process of opening a VPN connection is similar regardless of
the protocol and the choice between a built-in and third-party client.
First, the client establishes a connection to the specified server with
the selected protocol. The client and the server then authenticate
each other in the selected protocol with the previously configured
credentials and roots of trust. After successful authentication, the
client and server negotiate various parameters for the VPN connec-
tion, such as the encryption scheme and the DNS servers. When
the negotiation is completed, the client computer’s routing table or
firewall rules are configured to tunnel all network traffic through
the VPN connection.
The VPN providers do not always have native client applications
for all operating systems, such as Linux. Some users may also prefer
not to install the provided application. For these users, the VPN
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providers give instructions on their websites for configuring the
OS’s built-in VPN client. They may also give advice on installing
and configuring third-party clients to use with their service.
3 STUDY OF COMMERCIAL VPN SERVICES
This section gives an overview of our study of commercial VPN
services. We first describe the adversary model. We then explain
the methodology for systematically finding vulnerabilities in VPN
client configuration, covering a large part of the consumer VPN
market. The discovered vulnerabilities will be described in detail in
the next section.
3.1 Adversary model
The object of our study is the way commercial VPN services make
use of the common VPN protocols and tunnels. We consider two
types of attackers: network attacker and local attacker. The former
is the standard model for network security, while the latter extends
the attacker model to non-privileged processes running on the same
computer as the VPN client software.
Network attacker.We consider an active network attacker who
can intercept and modify network traffic originating from and
destined to the user’s machine. The attacker could, for example, be
a rogue hotspot operator at a hotel or airport, or a compromised
core-network operator.
Local attacker. The VPN client software on the user’s computer
often comprises multiple components that are connected to each
other with inter-process communication (IPC). For example, the
GUI component may use an IPC channel to sent the VPN configura-
tion to a third-party client binary. It has been recently shown that
misconfigured IPC may be vulnerable to attacks by non-privileged
processes of other users, including guest users, who have access
to the same computer (so-called Man-in-the-Machine attacks [32]).
These unprivileged attackers could exploit the IPC channels of VPN
client applications to steal sensitive information or to modify the
VPN connection settings. We included this new type of attackers to
the study because the vulnerability of VPN clients to it is currently
not well understood and the attacks are different from those on the
network. (Note that we do not consider malware that is running
with the victim user’s privileges or as administrator. While these
threats can be serious, the current desktop OSs are not expected to
offer protection against them.)
In both the network and local attacks, the ultimate goal of the
attackers is to bypass the protection mechanisms of the VPN con-
nection so that they can steal sensitive data sent or received through
it.
3.2 Methodology
Given the large number of commercial VPN services that exist
today, it is not possible to study all of them. Therefore, we selected
30 of them based on popularity and advertised features (refer to
Table 2). As a rough estimate of popularity, we searched for “best
VPN services” on Google and counted howmany times each service
was mentioned in the resulting pages. The idea was to identify the
services that normal users would be most likely to choose. Among
the popular commercial VPN services, we prioritized those that
support a higher number of VPN protocols.
We focused on the standardized and most commonly supported
VPN protocols: PPTP, L2TP/IPsec, IKEv2, Cisco IPsec, SSTP, OpenVPN,
and SoftEther VPN. We omitted from the study some proprietary
protocols (e.g. OpenWeb and StealthVPN by Astrill [28]) or in-
progress designs (e.g. WireGuard [22]) that are not widely deployed
in the regular Internet user community.
In addition to looking for new vulnerabilities, we also checked
whether the selected commercial VPN providers use publicly known
pre-shared keys for L2TP/IPsec (see Section 1). The reason for
investigating this known vulnerability is that it severely undermines
the security of the users and there was no evidence that VPN service
providers had taken the issue seriously.
We analyzed the selected VPN services with a semi-manual
two-step process: (1) configuration analysis and (2) experimental
verification.
Configuration analysis. In each of the commercial VPN client
applications, we looked at the way the application creates and
configures the VPN connection. When the VPN service providers
recommended a built-in client in the OS or a third-party client, we
scrutinized the provided configuration instructions and unchanged
default settings. In both cases, we looked for potential misconfigura-
tions and architectural mistakes that might compromise the security
of the resulting VPN connection. We did not try to find flaws in the
cryptographic protocols themselves or code-level implementation
errors.
Experimental verification. When we found a potential client-
configuration issue, we verified it by implementing an exploit with
a set of semi-automated tools built for the purpose. Depending on
the type of the attack, the verification was done as follows.
For network attacks, we first created a fake VPN server to inter-
cept connections from the client to the gateway server. We then
routed the VPN client’s traffic to the fake server as follows. When
testing a commercial VPN client application, we edited /etc/hosts
to map the true VPN server’s domain name to the fake server’s IP
address. When testing the instructions for configuring a built-in or
third-party VPN client, we simply followed the instruction but gave
the fake server’s IP address as the gateway address. These meth-
ods sufficiently emulate the behavior of a network attacker that
intercepts the connections on an untrusted access or core network.
Finally, if the VPN client successfully connected to the fake server
without dropping the connection or alerting the user, we concluded
that the client is vulnerable to the attack currently under test.
We used Poptop [8] to build the fake PPTP server, OpenVPN
software [7] for the fake OpenVPN server, StrongSwan [15] for the
fake IKEv2 and Cisco IPsec servers, and SoftEtherVPN software [13]
for the fake SoftEther VPN, SSTP, and L2TP/IPsec servers (the
SoftEtherVPN software supports multiple VPN protocols).
On the other hand, for local attacks, we created two user ac-
counts on a test machine: one acted as the honest user and the
other as the attacker. The attacker here is a standard user with no
administrative privileges (a guest account can be equally used). We
wrote a script to exploit the potential vulnerability in the inter-
process communication, executed it in the attacker’s login session,
and checked whether it succeeded in exploiting the vulnerability
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in the VPN client application that was running in the honest user’s
login session.
4 STUDY RESULTS
This section describes the vulnerabilities that we found in the client
configuration of the commercial VPN services selected for this study.
In each subsection, we present a brief overview of the VPN protocol,
followed by the vulnerabilities related to it. Table 2 summarizes our
findings.
4.1 Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol
Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) [42] was created by Mi-
crosoft, and it is one of the oldest VPN protocols. It has well-known
weaknesses [43, 48, 49, 61] and is no longer considered secure. Nev-
ertheless, the protocol remains widely deployed and used because
many firewalls do not block it. Our goal is to analyze the PPTP con-
figurations of commercial VPN services to see whether they have
additional weaknesses that could further compromise the users’
security and privacy.
There are two parallel parts im a PPTP connection: a TCP control
connection and an IP tunnel, as illustrated in Figure 1. To instantiate
a PPTP tunnel, the client first establishes the control connection to
port 1723 of the PPTP server. The control connection is then used to
initiate and manage an IP tunnel between the client and the server,
and a Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [62] session inside the IP tunnel.
PPTP uses Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) [37] to encapsulate
PPP packets. The encapsulation also supports flow control and
congestion control on the tunnel. The GRE header in PPTP differs
slightly from the GRE specification by having an acknowledgment
number field. This field is used to determine whether a particular
GRE packet or set of packets has arrived at the other endpoint of
the tunnel [42].
TCP Control connection
1723
Client IP tunnel
PPP over GRE 
(auth=MS-CHAPv2) 
Server
Figure 1: Typical PPTP connection
The PPP session goes through the following three phases:
(1) Authentication: The communication endpoints must first au-
thenticate each other. PPP supports various authentication
methods; however, most commercial VPN services imple-
ment only MS-CHAPv2.
(2) Negotiation: If the authentication is successful, the client
and the server negotiate parameters such as the encryption
scheme and the DNS servers for the client. The only encryp-
tion scheme that PPP supports is Microsoft Point-to-Point
Encryption (MPPE) [53]. A well-configured PPTP server usu-
ally enforces MPPE with 128-bit keys on its connections.
The encryption key is derived from the authentication in the
previous phase. It is important to note that all packets until
completion of the negotiation phase are transmitted in plain
text.
(3) Data exchange: Finally, the client starts communicating net-
work traffic with the server by encrypting it as per the nego-
tiated encryption scheme.
Optional encryption.Windows by default does not enforce en-
cryption on any VPN connection. We found that many of the com-
mercial VPN services in our study do not instruct their users to
change this setting while configuring PPTP with the built-in client
on Windows. A network attacker can take advantage of this behav-
ior to perform server impersonation as follows. First, the attacker
acts as a man-in-the-middle to forward traffic between the client
and the honest server until the authentication phase is finished.
The attacker then switches to performing server impersonation and
negotiates with the client not to encrypt the data exchange. The
client agrees to this because it is not mandatory to use encryption.
As the result, the attacker obtains all traffic of the victim just as if
no VPN was used.
4.2 SSTP
Secure socket tunneling protocol (SSTP) [11] is another VPN proto-
col created by Microsoft. Figure 2 shows an overview of a typical
SSTP connection. It utilizes PPP to transport network traffic, but
instead of using GRE as PPTP does, it encapsulates the PPP packets
in HTTPS.
Client Server
443
HTTPS
PPP over SSTP 
(auth=MS-CHAPv2) 
Figure 2: Typical SSTP connection
An SSTP connection is established as follows:
(1) First, the client opens an HTTPS connection to the server.
The client authenticates the server by verifying the server’s
TLS certificate as in any HTTPS connection.
(2) If the TLS authentication succeeds, the client begins SSTP
negotiation by sending a Connect-Request message to the
server. The server replieswith a Connect-Acknowledgement
message that contains a nonce to be used later.
(3) Both sides perform the PPP authentication, deriving a session
key for MPPE. Like in PPTP, MS-CHAPv2 is usually used for
this. However, in this case, MS-CHAPv2 is protected against
active and passive attacks by the HTTPS encryption.
(4) The client sends a Call-Connected message that contains
the nonce received from the server, a hash of the server
certificate from the HTTPS handshake, and a message au-
thentication code (MAC) that is computed over the message
with the MPPE key derived during the PPP authentication.
4
Client-side Vulnerabilities in Commercial VPNs
This message cryptographically binds the PPP session to the
server identity from the outer TLS authentication.
(5) The endpoints perform the PPP negotiation and then start
to exchange network traffic. SSTP does not use MPPE en-
cryption. Instead, it relies entirely on HTTPS for the secure
delivery of its messages.
Windows has a built-in SSTP client. On macOS and Ubuntu,
VPN services usually suggest the user to install EasySSTP and sstp-
client, respectively [58, 63, 64, 66]. EasySSTP [1], however, has not
received any updates since 2013, and it no longer works on the
latest version of macOS (10.14) at the time of writing this paper.
Ignored certificate verification failures. We tested the SSTP
client on Windows 10 and the latest sstp-client (v1.0.11) to see
whether they perform the mutual authentication properly. While
the Windows client does this correctly, sstp-client on Ubuntu
does not consider whether the server’s certificate is trusted. By
inspecting the source code of sstp-client [14], we found the
reason for this unexpected behavior: the sstp-client is integrated
into Ubuntu network connection manager, which allows the user to
configure whether the connection should be terminated when the
certificate verification fails, but sstp-client ignores certificate
verification errors regardless of this setting.
Ignoring the certificate verification failure allows the network at-
tacker to perform a server impersonation attack as follows. First, the
fake server presents a self-signed TLS certificate to the honest client.
The fake server then connects to the honest server pretending to be
the client. The attacker forwards traffic between the honest client
and the honest server until the PPP authentication is completed
and the attacker sees the Call-Connected message (Step 4 above).
The attacker then stops forwarding traffic to the honest server and
finishes the PPP negotiation by itself. When the SSTP connection
is successfully established, the attacker’s fake server can act as the
VPN gateway and obtain all the victim’s traffic.
4.3 IKEv2
IKEv2 VPN is a more modern VPN protocol based on IPsec. It uses
IKEv2 [46] for authentication as well as establishing and maintain-
ing security associations. One improvement of IKEv2 over IKEv1
is that the new protocol allows each endpoint to use a different
authentication method. IKEv2 also supports EAP [23], extending
the selection of available authentication methods.
IPsec  
(IKEv2, server-auth=PUBKEY, 
client-auth=EAP-MSCHAPv2) 
Client Server
Figure 3: Typical IKEv2 VPN connection
Figure 3 shows a typical setup by VPN services. The server
authenticates itself to the client with a certificate while the client
authenticates to the server with EAP-MSCHAPv2 [44], which is
basically MS-CHAPv2 encapsulated in the EAP protocol. The IKEv2
connection establishment works as follows:
(1) Initial exchange: The client and server negotiate security
parameters, such as cryptographic algorithms, and exchange
nonces and Diffie-Hellman (DH) values. After that, each
party computes the shared session keys, which will be used
for protecting all the following messages. These values will
also be used for constructing the first security association
(SA).
(2) Server authentication: The server authenticates itself to the
client with its certificate (or certificate chain) and a signature
on the SA data.
(3) Client authentication with EAP: The client is then authenti-
cated with the EAP-MSCHAPv2 protocol. After completion
of EAP-MSCHAPv2 protocol, the client and server exchange
MACs to bind the EAP authentication to the created SA. The
MACs are calculated over the SA data with the session key
produced by the MS-CHAPv2 protocol.
Both Windows and macOS have built-in support for IKEv2. On
Linux systems such as Ubuntu, commercial VPN services usually
instruct their users to install StrongSwan [15], an open-source IPsec
implementation, for the client.
Unspecified server name. To establish an IKEv2 connection with
StrongSwan on Ubuntu, the user has to create a profile for the con-
nection in /etc/ipsec.conf. Several commercial VPN providers
in our study instruct their users to create the profile as follows (only
important parts are shown).
l e f t a u t h =eap−mschapv2
. . .
r i g h t =< s e rve r −addre s s >
r i g h t a u t h =pubkey
r i g h t i d =%any
. . .
Left and right indicate the client and the server, respectively.
With such a profile, the server uses a public key for authentication
while the client uses EAP-MSCHAPv2. The problem is with the
rightid setting, which tells how the server should be identified in
the authentication. Since it is set to %any, the client will accept any
certified server regardless of its identity. Consequently, the network
attacker can pick any domain that it owns and purchase a certificate
from a widely trusted CA. The attacker can then impersonate the
server in the server authentication step because the VPN client
does not check the name in the certificate.
However, MS-CHAPv2 actually provides mutual authentication
with the user password. The binding of this authentication to the
SA prevents the attacker from completing the protocol without
knowing the user password. Thus, the misconfiguration effectively
reduces the security of IKEv2 to that of MS-CHAPv2, which unfor-
tunately is equal to the strength of a single DES encryption and
also vulnerable to password cracking [48, 61]. The resulting secu-
rity is significantly weaker than expected because usually these
weaknesses of MS-CHAPv2 are masked when it is used inside a
server-authenticated tunnel.
5
*A refined version of this draft, with the same title, has been published in the 24th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems.
4.4 OpenVPN
OpenVPN [5] appears to be the most widely supported protocol by
commercial VPN services. It uses TLS as the underlying authentica-
tion and key exchange protocol. Commercial VPN services deploy
OpenVPN in the client-server mode. In this mode, the server au-
thenticates itself to the client with an X.509 certificate signed by a
CA that the client trusts while the client proves its identity to the
server with a username and password.
Despite the wide range of configuration options that OpenVPN
supports, we did not find any broken configuration examples that
would allow the network attacker to compromise the OpenVPN
connection. This is probably because OpenVPN has very detailed
documentation and configuration guidelines. We found, however,
that local attackers, i.e. non-privileged local users and processes
(see Section 3.1), can steal the username and password that are used
for authenticating the client.
Most OSs do not provide native support for OpenVPN. Thus,
commercial VPN services have to include the open-source openvpn
client binary [7] in their client software to support the protocol.
The binary is run as a daemon, which creates the VPN connection
to the server. For this, it needs configuration information including
the server address, server name, and trusted CA certificate. There
are two ways of delivering the configuration information to the
openvpn daemon: the client GUI application can either write the
configuration to a file or pass it to the daemon as command-line
parameters. Additionally, the daemon will need the client’s VPN
username and password, which can be specified either in the con-
figuration file or via the management interface described below.
The OpenVPN daemon supports a management interface [6],
which allows administrative control via a TCP connection. By de-
fault, it only accepts connections on the localhost interface, and it
can be configured to require password authentication of the admin-
istrator. The advantage of the management interface is that the user
can avoid saving the client credentials into the configuration file on
the disk. The commercial VPN application first starts the OpenVPN
daemon with all the necessary configuration options, except the
client credentials, and puts it on hold with the management-hold
option. The application then connects to the management interface
of the daemon, gives it the username and password, and finally
releases the connection from the hold state.
Credential leakage. Some commercial VPN client applications are
careless when passing the username and password to the OpenVPN
daemon. Specifically, the VPN applications store the credentials
in configuration files that are readable to all users on the client
computer. On Windows, the configurations are usually stored in
the ProgramData or Program File folders, and the vulnerable
software does not set the access-control list to prevent unauthorized
users from accessing it. Therefore, the local attacker (i.e. any un-
privileged process running on the same computer) can capture this
sensitive information. Some of these services remove the credentials
from the file after the connection has been established, but this still
leaves a window of a few seconds to capture the information.
Lack of adminpassword.Another issuewithmost of the commer-
cial VPN services in our study is that they do not enable password
protection on the management interface. We do not know of a way
to exploit this weakness, except denial-of-service attacks to annoy
the victim user. However, we would not be surprised if the lack of
authentication is later found to enable exploits by local attackers.
4.5 SoftEther VPN
SoftEther VPN [12] is another VPN protocol with an open-source
implementation that tunnels Ethernet frames over HTTPS. Similar
to OpenVPN in the client-server mode, the SoftEther VPN server
proves its identity to the client with a TLS certificate while the
client has a username and password for its authentication.
The SoftEther VPN connection establishment is implemented in
two binaries: vpncmd, the command-line administrative tool, and
vpnclient, its command execution worker. The vpnclientworker
process runs a TCP server on port 5555 for receiving administra-
tive commands. By default, the TCP server accepts connections
only from the localhost interface. It can be configured to require
password authentication.
By issuing commands to the vpnclient TCP server, vpncmd can
perform administrative operations such as creating a new VPN
profile or editing an existing one, or starting and stopping a VPN
connection with an existing profile. SoftEther VPN profiles have
various configurable options, including whether the client should
check the server’s TLS certificate or not.
No server verification. Hide.me supports SoftEther VPN on its
GUI. However, the CheckServerCert parameter is set to false in
its client configuration. Consequently, the client does not verify the
server’s certificate. This allows the network attacker to perform a
MitM attack on its connections. The attacker can thus obtain the
victim’s credentials and network traffic.
Some other commercial VPN services support SoftEther VPN by
providing instructions on how to connect to their servers with the
SoftEther VPNGUI application [13]. When creating a new SoftEther
VPN connection, the GUI allows the user to choose whether the
client verifies the server’s certificate. The default setting is False,
and the VPN services do not tell their users to change the setting.
Thus, they are vulnerable to the same attacks as Hide.me.
Wrong VPN server. We found another problem with Hide.me,
which is that its GUI does not require password authentication on
the management interface of the vpnclient process. This allows
the local attacker to connect to the interface and, for example,
launch a new VPN connection that routes all network traffic of the
victim to a malicious server under the attacker’s control. This is a
typical case of the man-in-the-machine attack on IPC [32].
4.6 L2TP/IPsec
As mentioned in Section 1, many commercial VPN services were
using known pre-shared keys to authenticate the IPsec tunnel in
2016 [18]. Now, several years later, 26 out of the 30 commercial
VPN services in our study still have this vulnerability, despite the
fact that there are solutions available (see Section 5).
In the L2TP/IPsec VPN connection, L2TP [65] and IPsec together
provide two layers of authentication, as shown in Figure 4: (1) IKEv1
for authenticating the communicating machines and (2) Password
Authentication Protocol (PAP) or Challenge-Handshake Authenti-
cation Protocol (CHAP) [47] for authenticating the user. However,
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Operat typeing systems W U U W W, M W, M W, M, U W, M, U W, M
Attacker type Network Network Network Local Network Local Network Network Network
Astrill ✓ – – ✓ – – ✗ ✗ –
BoxPN ✗ – – ✗ – – ✗ ✗ –
CactusVPN ✗ – – ✓ ✗ – ✗ – –
CyberGhost ✓ – – ✓ – – ✗ ✗ ✓
ExpressVPN – – – ✗ – – ✗ – ✗
FastestVPN ✓ – – ✗ – – ✗ ✗ –
FrootVPN ✗ – – ✗ – – ✗ ✗ –
GooseVPN – – – ✗ – – ✗ ✗ ✗
Hide.me ✓ – ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ ✗ – ✓
HideMyAss ✗ – – ✗ – – ✗ ✗ –
ibVPN ✗ – – ✓ ✗ – ✗ ✗ ✓
IPVanish ✗ – – ✗ – – ✗ ✗ –
IVPN – – ✓ ✓ – – – – –
LimeVPN ✗ – – – ✗ – ✗ – –
NordVPN – – ✗ ✓ – – – – –
OverplayVPN ✓ – – ✓ – – ✗ – –
Perfect-Privacy – – – ✓ – – ✗ ✗ ✓
PersonalVPN ✗ – ✓ – – – ✗ ✗ –
Private Internet Access ✓ – – ✓ – – ✗ – –
PrivateVPN ✓ – – ✓ – – ✗ ✗ –
ProXPN – – – ✓ – – – – ✗
PureVPN ✗ ✗ – ✗ ✗ – ✗ – ✓
RocketVPN – – – – ✗ – ✗ – –
SaferVPN ✗ – – ✓ – – ✗ – ✗
StrongVPN ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ – – ✗ ✗ –
TorGuard ✗ ✗ – ✓ – – ✗ ✗ –
Trust.Zone – – – – ✗ – ✗ – –
UnblockVPN ✗ ✗ – – – – ✗ – –
VyprVPN ✗ – – ✓ – – ✓ – –
24VC – – – – ✗ – ✗ – –
Table 2: Summary of discovered vulnerabilities (✗: vulnerable, ✓: not vulnerable, –: not applicable,
W: Windows, M: macOS, U: Ubuntu)
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IPsec (IKEv1, auth=PSK)
L2TP (auth=PAP)Client Server
Figure 4: Typical L2TP/IPsec connection
the confidentiality and integrity of the resulting connection rely
entirely on the IPsec tunnel because L2TP does not provide any
transport protection. Thus, if the network attacker manages to
break the IPsec tunnel, the integrity and confidentiality of the con-
nection are compromised. By using a known pre-shared key to
authenticate the IPsec tunnel, commercial VPN providers enable
the network attacker to perform a MitM attack on the L2TP/IPsec
connection and to capture the victim’s network traffic.
4.7 Cisco IPsec
IPsec  
(IKEv1, auth=PSK+XAUTH) Client Server
Figure 5: Typical Cisco IPsec connection
Cisco IPsec [35] is widely used in enterprise VPNs. However, it
is also supported by a number of commercial VPN services. Like
L2TP/IPsec, the protocol uses IPsec to tunnel traffic between the
client and the server, as illustrated in Figure 5. The main distin-
guishing feature of Cisco IPsec is that, after the communicating
nodes have completed the conventional IKEv1 authentication, an
additional phase of Extended Authentication (XAUTH) [55] is per-
formed to authenticate the user. XAUTH allows various types of
user authentication, such as challenge-response and one-time pass-
word.
Known pre-shared keys. We found that all of the commercial
VPN services that support Cisco IPsec in our study use a pre-shared
key to authenticate the IPsec tunnel. Learning from the experience
of L2TP/IPsec, it is rather obvious to ask where the endpoints get
the pre-shared key. The user interfaces of the commercial VPN
clients do not have a way of entering such a key. Perhaps unsur-
prisingly, we found that the commercial VPN services have fixed
pre-shared keys also for Cisco IPsec. This allows the network at-
tacker to perform MitM attacks on these IPsec connections and to
obtain all the network traffic.
4.8 Fallback strategy
As mentioned in Section 2, commercial VPN services usually have
a list of protocols from which the user can choose on the GUI of the
provided application. A special option that several services in our
study support is Automatic, which means that the application will
automatically select the protocol for the user. The way this works
is that the application tries different protocols one after another
until it succeeds in creating a VPN connection. Users typically
choose this option if the firewall in the access network blocks some
VPN protocols, or if they do not want to understand the technical
intricacies of choosing the right protocol.
Fallback to weak option. It is easy to see that the security of
the fallback strategy is equal to that of the weakest option which
the application is willing to try. The network attacker can simply
block all other connection attempts. We found that some commer-
cial VPN services include L2TP/IPsec with publicly-known pre-
shared key as an option in their automatic mode. For example,
ExpressVPN attempts to use the following protocols: OpenVPN,
SSTP, and L2TP/IPsec. If the network attacker blocks the first two
(e.g. by filtering the corresponding ports), it effectively forces the
client to use L2TP/IPsec. As the result, the attacker can perform a
MitM attack on the VPN connection and obtain the traffic.
Windows also provides similar fallback strategies when RRAS
is used to create the VPN connection. RRAS allows the develop-
ers to choose the order in which it attempts VPN protocols until
the connection is successfully established. This is configured with
the VpnStrategy option [10]. ProXPN, when configuring its IKEv2
client on Windows, instead of setting VpnStrategy to 5 (i.e. at-
tempting IKEv2 only), sets the option to 8, which effectively tells
the client to try the following protocols in order: IKEv2, SSTP, PPTP,
and L2TP/IPsec. This causes the application to suffer from the same
vulnerability in the automatic mode as ExpressVPN.
5 MITIGATION SOLUTIONS
In this section, we discuss potential solutions to the issues presented
in Section 4.
PPTP. As explained in Section 4.1, PPTP encryption is optional in
the Windows implementation. Fixing this issue is straightforward:
the VPN service providers simply need to update their instructions
to tell Windows users to change the Data encryption setting of the
PPTP connection adapter from Optional encryption to Maximum
strength encryption. This enforces MPPE encryption with a 128-
bit key on the connection. A more sustainable solution would be
for Windows to employ strong encryption by default. While such
changes to default settings are not always feasible for backward
compatibility reasons, secure by default is one of the key principles
in designing secure systems.
SSTP. The sstp-client in Ubuntu ignores certificate verification
failures. As pointed out in Section 4.2, the flaw is in the sstp-client
library code. Until it is fixed, commercial VPN services should ex-
plicitly instruct their users to not use sstp-client and possibly
provide an alternative. The broader issue here is that modern soft-
ware development practices create complex dependencies on free
and third-party components, for which there may not be guaran-
teed maintenance. One would expect security-critical services, such
as commercial VPNs, to manage their dependencies carefully.
IKEv2. Setting the rightid value of a StrongSwan’s IKEv2 config-
uration to %any could be useful, for example, when testing a VPN
server. However, the setting should never be used in production. To
fix the problem, the commercial VPN providers should give clear
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instructions to the users to set rightid to the server’s domain
name or to the Distinguished Name from the server’s certificate [2].
Alternatively, if the right parameter (i.e. the address of the server)
is already set to the server’s domain name, rightid does not need
to be configured because it equals the value of right by default.
The security failure here arises from the fact that it is easier to
get the service to work with insecure wildcard settings than to find
out and configure the correct server name. Even if the VPN service
providers documented the correct usage, some users would find
easier, insecure configuration entries online. Probably the only safe
solution in this case is to automate the setup process and to audit
the configuration regularly for unsafe changes by the user.
OpenVPN. The obvious solution to unauthorized users reading
the OpenVPN configuration file is to set the access controls on
the file, which is world-readable by default. Another solution is
to avoid writing the VPN username and password to the file by
communicating them over the management interface. Password
authentication on the management interface is also a good practice,
even though the lack of authentication does not result in known
attacks in OpenVPN.
Storing secrets on the local machine is a problem encountered
commonly by security-critical software. There is no perfect solution
but making use of operating-systems access controls to is a good
starting point. The next step might be a secure hardware module
for storing client credentials.
SoftEther VPN. Access to the management interface is far more
critical in SoftEther VPN than in OpenVPN because, without au-
thentication of the administrator, it allows any local user or process
to control the VPN connections. Thus, the management interface
must be protected with proper password authentication. The higher-
level issue here is that TCP connections to the localhost are not
inherently secure and may require application-level authentication
between the client and the server [32].
To fix the server verification problem that we described, the
CheckServerCert parameter of the SoftEther VPN connection
must be set to true so that the client verifies the server’s certificate
during the establishment of the connection. This can be done either
by changing the default value of CheckServerCert in SoftEther,
or the VPN services can provide explicit instructions to their cus-
tomers to do the same. This again highlights the importance of
safe default values and the danger of allowing easy but insecure
settings.
L2TP/IPsec and Cisco IPsec. The commercial VPN services that
support the L2TP/IPsec and Cisco IPsec protocols share the same
problem of using known pre-shared key for the IPsec authentication.
Before considering solutions, it is worth discussing the reason for
the use of fixed keys in these IPsec-based VPN protocols. They both
use IKEv1 in the Main Mode, in which the server selects the pre-
shared key by the IP address of the client. IKEv1 and the entire IPsec
architecture reside in the IP layer, and thus the IP address is the only
clue available for them about the client identity. Since the clients of
the commercial VPN services practically always have dynamic IP
addresses, it is not possible for the VPN gateway to support client-
specific pre-shared keys. There have been proprietary proposals
for sending a hint about the client identity to the server, but the
rather historical IKEv1 protocol and its implementations have not
been updated to support such new features in an interoperable way.
Thus, the commercial VPN services have fallen back to the insecure
practice of sharing the same key between all clients.
A solution is to switch from pre-shared keys to certificate au-
thentication. For this, the commercial VPN services must obtain
certificates for their VPN servers from a widely trusted commercial
CA. The client certificates, on the other hand, can be provisioned
by the VPN service provider itself. Client-side authentication in
IKEv1 is not extremely critical anyway because the client user is
authenticated separately with username and password in the later
phases of the VPN protocols. It would, nevertheless, be a good prac-
tice to authenticate both the client device (with a certificate) and
the client user (with username and password), so that devices and
users can be revoked individually.
Fallback strategy. Since the security of a fallback strategy is equal
to the weakest allowed option, L2TP/IPsec with the known pre-
shared key and PPTP with its cryptographic weaknesses should be
disabled in any automatic protocol selection process.
As mentioned earlier, one of the main reasons why commercial
VPN services provide fallback options is to bypass firewall filters.
The fallback strategy for firewall traversal gives an advantage to
any malicious access-network operator or oppressive government
that wants to attack VPN users. An alternative approach would be
to only try safe firewall traversal techniques such as using server
ports that are usually not blocked (e.g. 443). Clearly, the commercial
VPN service market has led some providers to maximize service
availability at the cost of security even when the two are in direct
conflict.
When using RRAS to create VPN connections on Windows
clients, the VpnStrategy setting should never be set to 0, 2, 4, 6
or 8. The reason is that all these values instruct Windows to at-
tempt IKEv2, SSTP, PPTP, and L2TP/IPsec, just in different orders,
until one succeeds. In an ideal world, Windows would stop sup-
porting protocols and configuration options with known serious
vulnerabilities.
6 RESPONSIBLE DISCLOSURE
We have reported all the vulnerabilities that we discussed in this
paper to the corresponding VPN service providers. We described
the attacks and their impact to them as well as provided suggestions
on how to mitigate the attacks (see Section 5). At the moment of
writing, 10 of the tested providers have responded to us. They
acknowledged all the problems and have fixed all of them, except
the pre-shared key issue in L2TP/IPsec and Cisco IPsec, for which
they are still discussing about the solution that we have proposed.
In addition, we reported the optional encryption problem of
PPTP to the Microsoft security response team with the hope that
they would change the default behavior of Windows VPN clients.
While they acknowledged the problem, they are already looking
into deprecating PPTP, and thus no immediate fixes will be released.
Similarly, we have contacted the SoftEther team about the de-
fault value of the CheckServerCert parameter. Even though they
acknowledge the problem, they are hesitant to change the default
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value of the software. According to them, it is equally the responsi-
bility of the commercial VPN providers to learn to use the software
properly and to educate their customers with clear guidance.
Regarding sstp-client, we have reported its certificate verifi-
cation problem to the author but have not received a response, and
the project appears abandoned.
7 DISCUSSION
It appears that commercial VPN services compete by providing the
maximum number of features, such as different VPN protocols, and
maximum ease of use, and that security is a secondary concern for
them. For example, the issue of using publicly known pre-shared
keys for L2TP/IPsec has been known for years, but it has not been
addressed by most commercial VPN services. While this issue could
be solved by provisioning certificates to the clients as discussed
in Section 5, that would be an administrative hurdle for the VPN
service providers and might scare away non-expert customers. This
could be the reason why they have opted to continue the insecure
services rather than endanger their business growth.
There are also many entirely unnecessary flaws in the VPN
client settings, such as not checking the server certificate or server
name. These appear to indicate lack of technical knowledge or
security awareness by the service providers. We hope that the
current paper will, at least to some extent, increase awareness
about the importance of correct VPN configuration among the
commercial VPN developers and operators.
We further observed the importance of developer documentation
and configuration examples for third-party VPN software compo-
nents that are used as building blocks in the commercial VPN ser-
vices. Let us take OpenVPN for a positive example. It has detailed
documentation of all the software configuration options as well
as best-practice guidelines for building secure systems. Also, the
OpenVPN software warns the user about insecure settings. These
are probably the reasons why none of the commercial VPN services
in our study were found to have insecure OpenVPN configurations.
A more sinister explanation for the configuration weaknesses
might be that some access-network firewalls are intentionally con-
figured to permit insecure VPN protocols and applications while
blocking ones that are not vulnerable. This encourages commercial
VPNs to support vulnerable but apparently more reliable settings
and protocols, which can then be spied upon. There is anecdotal
evidence, both personal experience and online discussions about
traveling in China and other countries, of this kind of practice in re-
gions with strict government surveillance of citizens. For example,
PPTP often works while OpenVPN does not, even though PPTP is
not technically any more difficult to block. We can only speculate
about the exact reason for such selective blocking.
8 RELATEDWORK
Related work about security and privacy issues of VPNs can be
categorized as follows:
VPN client exploits. Fazal et al. demonstrated that an attacker
could penetrate into the VPN tunnel by exploiting clients with a
dual-NIC that supports bothWi-Fi and Ethernet [38]. Similarly, priv-
ilege escalation attacks, e.g. in NordVPN [20] and ProtonVPN [21],
allowed an attacker to gain access over the VPN traffic. Security
issues have also been found in proprietary VPN clients and devices
from Cisco [16, 17, 19], including remote code execution vulnera-
bilities.
Information leaks. There are have been various user de-anon-
ymization attacks that leak information about the VPN user, as
presented in the overview by Appelbaum et al. [27]. In a majority
of the cases, the VPN reveals user information due to IPv6 traffic
and DNS leakage [57]. Such leaks can also occur due to advanced
VPN functionality such as port forwarding [3], WebRTC [26], and
web cookie synchronization [54], which are not strictly related to
the VPN tunnel but can defeat some of its goals. Most of these issues
have also occurred on mobile-device-based VPNs [45, 68]. There are
online detection tools [25, 33, 59] with which the users can check
whether their VPN connection is leaking any such information.
Cryptographic vulnerabilities and design flaws. VPN proto-
cols have undergone critical cryptanalysis in the past [24, 31, 40, 61].
Among others, MS-CHAPv2 in PPTP is known to have crypto-
graphic weaknesses, and it is possible to break the protocol with
exhaustive key search [48, 61]. Moreover, it has also been shown
that breaking PPTP requires less effort when it is used in conjunc-
tion with a RADIUS server [43]. If used against a large number
of users and connections, these attacks demand relatively heavy
computing resources, whereas the configuration flaw explained in
this paper immediately exposes the user traffic.
Another known issue of PPTP is that the configuration packets
in the PPP negotiation phase are not authenticated [49]. This means
that a network attacker can spoof the packet containing the DNS
server’s address and effectively force all name resolution to happen
through a compromised name server. The misconfiguration of PPTP
in this paper brings slightly more benefit to the attacker because it
allows the attacker to obtain all network traffic of the victim, not
just the traffic that involves DNS. Also, by forcing no encryption,
the victim’s traffic is visible to everyone, not just the attacker.
Oracle-based attacks on VPN systems can also undermine the
security of the tunneled traffic. Nafeez disclosed the compression or-
acle attack on OpenVPN compression algorithms, where an attacker
can send cross-domain requests when an HTTP website is tunneled
through OpenVPN connections [50]. Felsch et al. demonstrated
that reusing the same key pair across IKEv1 and IKEv2 allows an
attacker to bypass authentication as well as perform impersonation
attacks [39]. They exploited Bleichenbacher oracles in the IKEv1
implementations of four large network equipment manufacturers
to break a majority of the handshake variants in IKEv1 and IKEv2.
Weak pseudo-random number generators (PRNG) in the VPN
implementation can also subvert the security of the cryptographic
protection. The weaknesses could be due to faulty implementation,
such as a hard-coded seed key along with a legacy PRNG [36], or
an intentional backdoor [30], or an intentionally insecure genera-
tor [34]. In any case, an attacker may be able to recover the secret
keys for the VPN tunnel and intercept the traffic passing through
the VPN.
There have been state-sponsored backdoors planted by surveil-
lance programs, for example project BULLRUN [56] and TUR-
MOIL [52], which were specifically designed to target VPN con-
nections [51]. While open-source implementations of standard pro-
tocols may have backdoors hidden in the code or specification,
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they at least can be audited by anyone. Proprietary protocols and
closed-source VPN implementations, on the other hand, are harder
to analyze.
9 CONCLUSION
In this work, we analyzed the security of how popular commercial
VPN providers set up, or instruct their users to set up, desktop
VPN clients. We studied commonly used VPN protocols and soft-
ware on Windows, macOS, and Ubuntu. We found vulnerabilities
in the client configurations of most of the protocols and clients.
These vulnerabilities allow network attackers to perform MitM or
server impersonation on the connection and thus obtain the vic-
tim’s original network traffic. Similarly, local attackers can exploit
vulnerabilities to steal user credentials for the VPN services. We
provide guidelines for fixing these vulnerabilities.
The main message of this paper is that security flaws, either
accidental or intentional, are not always deeply hidden in the code
or cryptography. Instead, simple configuration mistakes, poor in-
structions, insecure default values, and failure to disable broken
legacy features can result in widespread security failures across an
entire industry.
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